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CRIMINAL LAW-The Anomaly of a Murder: Not All FirstDegree Murder Mens Rea Standards Are EqualState v. Brown
I. TRODUCTION
In State v. Brown,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that fact finders may
consider evidence of the defendant's intoxication when determining whether the
defendant possessed the requisite mens rea of subjective knowledge for first-degree
allowed consideration of
depraved mind murder.' Before Brown, New Mexico
3 With its holding, the Brown
crimes.
intent
specific
for
voluntary intoxication only
court has singularly excepted first-degree depraved mind murder from the specificgeneral intent approach, thereby leaving felony murder as the only 4first-degree
murder for which voluntary intoxication does not provide a defense. This Note
describes Brown's historical context in New Mexico's criminal homicide
jurisprudence, examines the Brown court's rationale, and explores the implications
of the decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Jimmy Brown was arrested and charged on an open count of murder for the
5
shooting death of Oscar Zapata. Zapata was shot and killed at the house of his
girlfriend, Josephine Calanshe. Brown and Calanshe had met about six months
earlier. After dating only briefly, the two had remained friends once they began
dating other people. Brown and his friends often spent time at Calanshe's house,
drinking beer and "hanging out."
On the evening of the shooting, Brown went to Calanshe's house with two
friends. When they arrived, Calanshe introduced everyone to Zapata. Brown shook
hands with him, with no apparent friction showing between the two. The evening
was spent without argument. It is estimated that Brown and his two friends
consumed four and one-half cases of beer over the course of that day.

1. 122 N.M. 724,931 P.2d 69 (1996).
2. See id. at 732-33, 931 P.2d at 77-78. In doing so, the court held that the refusal to give an instruction
human
on intoxication constituted reversible error. See id First-degree depraved mind murder is "the killing of one
by
caused...
be
may
death
which
with
means
the
of
any
by
excuse,
or
justification
lawful
being by another without
N.M. STAT.
any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life."

depraved mind murder
ANN. § 30-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1994). The subjective knowledge mens rea of first-degree
degree of risk involved
requires that the defendant "must have had the subjective or actual knowledge of the high
in his conduct." Brown, 122 N.M. at 728, 931 P.2d at 73.

3. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 729,931 P.2d at 74 (recognizing that "New Mexico courts have long followed
only
the same common law specific-general intent approach, allowing voluntary intoxication as a consideration
specific-intent
for specific-intent crimes, including premeditated first-degree murder"). The Brown court defined a
a further
crime "as one for which a statute expressly requires proof of 'intent to do a further act or achieve
671, 579 P.2d 796,
consequence."' Brown, 122 N.M. at 729, 931 P.2d at 74 (quoting State v. Bender, 91 N.M. 670,
797 (1978)).

4. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 730,931 P.2d at 75 (affirming New Mexico's common law "general-specific

stating that "in the
intent analysis to exclude voluntary intoxication evidence for the crime of felony murder" but
murder").
mind
depraved
to
apply
not
does
analysis
intent
specific-general
the
...
instant case, however

5. The facts presented are paraphrased from the New Mexico Supreme Court opinion in State v. Brown,

this citation unless
122 N.M. 724, 725-26, 931 P.2d 69, 70-71 (1996). All subsequent factual references refer to

otherwise indicated.
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At the time of the shooting, Calanshe and Zapata were kissing. Another person
in the room testified that, upon hearing a loud sound, she turned to see Zapata shot
in the back of his head, with Brown at the foot of the bed holding a shotgun.
Awakened by the shot, one of Brown's friends ran to the room and, in a scuffle,
grabbed the shotgun from Brown.
At trial, Brown testified that he recalled nothing of the actual shooting. He
remembered certain earlier events of the day, before he fell asleep, and of the
shooting's aftermath, such as finding himself facing his friend, who was holding a
shotgun and telling Brown to get out. Brown stated that he left without knowing
what had happened. Brown also testified that he had experienced previous blackout
episodes from drinking. The State's pathologist testified that the single shot killing
the victim had been fired from three to six feet away.
The State sought a first-degree murder conviction based on deliberate intent
murder6 and depraved mind murder.7 At the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief,
the trial court directed a verdict of not guilty on deliberate intent murder. Uniform
jury instructions were given for first-degree depraved mind murder and seconddegree murder, but the trial court refused Brown's instruction on voluntary
intoxication. Brown was convicted of first-degree depraved mind murder. He
appealed on the ground that, because he was so severely intoxicated, "he was not
subjectively aware of the seriousness of the risk entailed by his conduct, as required
for depraved mind murder."'
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in a three to two decision, reversed and
remanded the case for failure to instruct the jury on Brown's theory of the case.9
The court stated that, given the evidence presented, because intoxication "is clearly
relevant to the formation of [the requisite mental state of subjective knowledge,]
...
the defendant must be allowed to show, by reference to intoxication, the absence
of that state of mind."'" The court declined to apply the previously recognized
distinction between first-degree depraved mind murder and second-degree murder.'

6. First-degree deliberate intent murder as used by the Brown court, see Brown, 122 N.M. at 726, 931
P.2d at 71 (1996), refers to "willful, deliberate and premeditated" murder. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2l(A)(l)(Repl. Pamp. 1994).
7. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1994)(defining murder); see also infra note 26 and
accompanying text, discussing the requisite mens rea for first-degree deliberate intent murder and first-degree
depraved mind murder as reflected in the relevant uniform jury instructions.
8. Brown, 122 N.M. at 732, 931 P.2d at 77.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72. The prior distinction between first-degree depraved mind murder and
second-degree murder was based on the "number of persons subjected to the risk of death." Id. First-degree
depraved mind murder applied to a murder where more than one person was subjected to the risk of death by
defendant's conduct. See N.M. UJ.I. CRIM. 14-203 (committee commentary) (stating that "this murder occurs when
the accused does an act which is dangerous to more than one person"); State v. Sena, 99 N.M. 272, 274, 657 P.2d
128, 130 (1983) (quoting N.M. U.J.L CRIM. 14-203 (committee commentary)). Second-degree murder is applicable
to a murder which placed only one person at risk. See N.M. U.J.1. CRIM. 14-211 (stating that for second-degree
murder, "[tihe defendant knew that his acts created a strong probability of death... to [the victim] [or any other
human being]") (second set of brackets in the original); Leo M. Romero, UnintentionalHomicides Causedby RiskCreatingConduct: Problems inDistinguishing Between Depraved Mind Murder, Second Degree Murder, and
Involuntary Manslaughter,and NoncriminalHomicide in New Mexico, 20 N.M. L REV. 55, 63 (1990) (discussing,
with disapproval, the courts' use of the "number of persons subjected to the risk" distinction). The Brown court
deemed this distinction not determinative in differentiating between first-degree depraved mind murder and second-
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Instead, the court carved out a narrow exception to the specific-general intent
2
analysis used to distinguish first-degree from second-degree murder.' By
reaffirming the application of the specific-general intent analysis to felony murder,
first-degree felony murder, designated as a general intent crime, becomes the only
first-degree murder for which the "lack of proof' defense of voluntary intoxication
is unavailable. 3
III. HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The 1980 Amendment to the Murder Statutes
Before 1980, murder was defined as "the unlawful killing of one being by
another with malice aforethought, either express or implied, by any of the means
with which death may be caused."' 4 First-degree murder included: (1) depraved
mind murder; (2) willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; and (3) felony
murder. 5 Second-degree murder consisted of all murder other than the enumerated
first-degree murders. 6 The malice required for murder was either express, when
there was "the deliberate intention" to kill,'" or implied, when the circumstances of
8
the killing showed "a wicked and malignant heart."'
In 1980, the legislature amended the murder statutes, eliminating "malice
9
aforethought" and repealing definitions of "express" and "implied" malice.1 The
murder statute, as amended, eliminated the general definition of murder, defining
first-degree murder as:
the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse,
by any of the means with which death may be caused:
(1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing;
(2) in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; or
(3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved
mind regardless of human life.
Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a capital felony.'
Second-degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as follows:
Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the
heat of passion, a person who kills another human being without lawful

degree murder. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72.
12. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72 (holding "the specific-general intent analysis does not
apply to depraved mind murder"). In establishing this exception, the court explicitly stated that it was not wholly
abandoning New Mexico's general-specific intent approach with respect to all offenses. See id. at 730, 931 P.2d
at 75.
13. See id. (affirming New Mexico's "general-specific intent analysis to exclude voluntary intoxication
evidence for the crime of felony murder").
14. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-1 (1953 & 1963 Supp.) (recompiled as N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (1978)).
15. See id. § 40A-2-1(A).
16. See id.§ 40A-2-l(B).
17. See id. § 40A-2-2(A).
18. See id. § 40A-2-2(B).
19. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-2-1, 30-2-2 (Cum. Supp. 1980) (annotations); State v. Brown, 122 N.M.
724, 730, 931 P.2d 69, 75 (1996) (quoting State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 565, 817 P.2d 1196,1207 (1991)).
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
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justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the
acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability
of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another.
Murder in the second degree is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder
in the first degree.'

In amending the statute in 1980, the legislature carried over verbatim the
language used to define first degree deliberate murder, depraved mind murder and
felony murder but eliminated the malice terminology from the murder statute, 22
while retaining it in the manslaughter statute. 23 New Mexico is one of only three
states that provides for first-degree depraved mind murder.2" Thus, New Mexico
courts have attempted to develop a statutory scheme which, in addition to
differentiating murder from manslaughter, must distinguish two degrees of murder
(first- and second-degree), including two degrees of unintentional murder: depraved
mind murder and second-degree murder.2"
B. New Mexico's CriminalLaw Before Brown
1. Distinguishing Between Murder and Manslaughter
To distinguish between murder and manslaughter, New Mexico courts have
developed a scheme in which the "malice required for.., murder is 'an intent to kill
or an intent to do an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others or with the
knowledge that the act creates a strong probability of death or great bodily harm." 26
Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful intentional killing2 7 "without malice ' 28 but

21. Id. § 30-2-1(B).
22. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-l(A) (1953 & 1963 Supp.), with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)
(Repl. Pamp. 1994).
23. Both statutes provide: "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice." See
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-3 (1953 & 1963 Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
24. The three states are New Mexico, Colorado and Washington. See State v. Brown, 122 N.M. 724, 727,
931 P.2d 69, 72 (1996); cf COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102 (West 1990) (providing a person commits the crime
of murder in the first degree if: "(d) Under circumstances evidencing an attitude of universal malice manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life generally, he knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave
risk of death to a person, or persons, other than himself, and thereby causes the death of another."); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030 (West Supp. 1998) (providing: "(1) A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
... (b) Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person; ... .
25. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72.
26. Id. at 730, 931 P.2d at 75 (quoting State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 565, 817 P.2d 1196, 1207 (1991)).
This scheme reflects a compilation of the mens rea elements found in New Mexico's Criminal Uniform Jury
Instructions. Compare N.M. U.J.L. Cium. 14-201 to -211 (describing the elements of willful and deliberate murder,
felony murder, depraved mind murder, and second-degree murder), with N.M. U.J.I. CRIM. 14-220 to -231
(describing the elements of manslaughter, voluntary and involuntary). First-degree willful and deliberate murder
requires killing with "deliberate intent." N.M. UJ.I. CRiM. 14-201. First-degree degree depraved mind murder
requires the defendant "to do an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others" and "It]he defendant knew that his
act was greatly dangerous to the lives of others." N.M. UJ.L. CRIM. 14-203. Frst degree felony murder requires that
the actor "intended to kill or knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm." N.M.
U.J.L CirM. 14-202. Second-degree murder requires that the actor "knew that his acts created a strong probability
of death or great bodily harm." N.M. UJ.L CRiM. 14-210, 14-211.
27. See N.M. U.J.1. CRIM. 14-220 (committee commentary); N.M. U.J.I. CRIM. 14-221 (committee
commentary).
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1994). See also N.M. U.J.I. CaiM. 14-220 (committee
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with the knowledge "that his acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm" to the victim or any other human being.29 Involuntary manslaughter
3
is either a misdemeanor-manslaughter 3° or a criminally negligent homicide, which
3
applies an objective reasonable person standard in determining mens rea. 2
2. Distinguishing Between First-Degree Murder and Second-Degree Murder
New Mexico courts have based the statutory scheme for murder on culpability,
noting that distinguishing between second-degree murder and first-degree murder
33
is of utmost importance in administering New Mexico's criminal justice system.
Only the most blameworthy, heinous and reprehensible class of homicides are to be
designated as first-degree murder.' The importance of this culpability distinction
between first- and second-degree murder serves to justify the more serious penal
consequences of first-degree murder.35
a. Intentional Murder
In distinguishing between first- and second-degree intentionalmurder, focus is
placed on the deliberation required in first-degree intentional murder, which is not
required in second-degree murder. In State v. Garcia,36 the New Mexico Supreme
Court approved the statutory scheme establishing first-degree intentional killings
as "those that are willful, deliberate, and premeditated" and second-degree
intentional killings as those "committed without such deliberation and
37
premeditation" so as to be "unconsidered and [committed on] rash impulse."

commentary) stating that "[voluntary] [m]anslaughter is an intentional homicide which is committed under
adequate legal provocation."); N.M. U.J.I CRIM. 14-221 (committee commentary) (stating that "[voluntary]
manslaughter is essentially second degree murder committed under sufficient provocation"). Thus, "sufficient
provocation" equates to an offense committed "without malice."
29. N.M. U.J.I. CRIM. 14-220, 14-221.
30. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3(B)("Involuntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed in
the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might
produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection.").
31. See id The jury instruction defines the mens rea of involuntary manslaughter as the defendant's willful
disregard for the safety of others and assigns to the defendant an awareness of the dangers attendant to his riskcreating conduct that the defendant shouldpossess. See N.M. UJ.l CRIM. 14-231 (emphasis added). Note that this
instruction was amended and became effective August 1, 1997 to conform to the holding in State v. Yarborough,
122 N.M. 596, 930 P.2d 131(1996) (requiring a showing of criminal negligence for conviction of involuntary
manslaughter, whether based on an "unlawful act" or "lawful act").
32. See N.M. UJ.I CRIM. 14-231. The involuntary manslaughter jury instruction provides, in relevant part,
that "the state must prove... beyond a reasonable doubt [that] ... [the defendant] should have known of the
danger involved by [his] actions [and] ... [the defendant] acted with a willful disregard for the safety of others [and
that said actions] caused the death of [another] .... " Id.
33. See State v. Brown, 122 N.M. 724,727,931 P.2d 69,72 (1996) (citing State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269,
272, 837 P.2d 862, 865 (1992)).
34. See id.
35. See id.The Brown court noted that first-degree murder is a capital crime. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-21(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
36. 114 N.M. 269, 837 P.2d 862 (1992).
37. Id. at 273, 837 P.2d at 866. While the jury instruction for first degree intentional murder requires the
state to prove that "[tIhe killing was with the deliberate intention to take away the life of [the victim] [or any other
human being]," N.M. UJI. CRIm. 14-201 (first set of brackets added), the jury instructions for second-degree
murder only require proof that the "defendant knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm [to the victim] [or any other human being]." N.M. UJ.I CRiM. 14-210, 14-211 (first set of brackets added).
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b. First-Degree Felony Murder Versus Second-Degree Murder
To distinguish between first-degree felony murder and second degree murder, the
court in State v. Ortega38 determined that murder which implicates the felony
murder rule necessitates "proof of an intent to kill."" The Ortega court recognized
that felony murder requires the underlying felony to be a first degree or other
inherently dangerous felony.' The Ortegacourt further elaborated that "there must
be proof that the defendant intended to kill (or was knowingly heedless that death
might result from his conduct).""' The Ortega court stated that felony murder
elevates second-degree murder, with the requisite criminal intent,42 to first-degree
murder, when done in the commission or attempted commission of a first-degree or
other inherently dangerous felony.43
c. Unintentional Murder
New Mexico courts have encountered difficulties in developing a coherent,
principled rule for distinguishing between unintentional murders." Courts have
distinguished first-degree depraved mind murder from second-degree murder in the
belief that first-degree depraved mind murder occurs when an actor's conduct
endangers more than one person.45 This theory was based on the plural language of
"lives of others" found in the first-degree murder statute 46 and accompanying jury
4 7 as compared
instruction
with second-degree murder, which contemplates one
4
victim.

The subjective knowledge element for depraved mind murder was first imposed
in State v. McCrary.49 The court identified distinguishable mens rea elements in the

38. 112 N.M. 554, 817 P.2d 1196 (1991).
39. See id. at 557, 817 P.2d at 1199.
40. See id. (citing State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321 (1977)).
41. Id. at 563, 817 P.2d at 1205 (second emphasis added).
42. See id. at 565, 817 P.2d at 1207 (defining the mens rea of second-degree murder as "an intent to kill
or with knowledge that the act creates a strong probability of death or great bodily harm").
43. See id.
44. See Romero, supra note 11, at 61 ("The current New Mexico murder statute establishes two degrees of
reckless murder, frequently called depraved mind or depraved heart murder, but fails to provide clear and workable
distinctions between depraved mind first degree and depraved mind second degree murders.").
45. See State v. Sena, 99 N.M. 272, 274, 657 P.2d 128, 130 (1983) (quoting N.M. U.J.I. CRIM. 14-203
(committee commentary)) limited by State v. Brown, 122 N.M. 724, 931 p.2d 69 (1996)(finding the number of
persons at risk not a determinative distinction); State v. DeSantos, 89 N.M. 458, 553 P.2d 1265 (1976) (finding
it reversible error to instruct on depraved mind murder where act is dangerous only to one person) limited by State
v. Brown, 122 N.M. 724, 931 p.2d 69 (1996)(finding the number of persons at risk not determinative).
46. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (requiring proof that death was caused by "any
act greatly dangerous to the lives of others").
47. See N.M. UJ.I CiuM. 14-203 (requiring, in part, proof that the defendant's act was "greatly dangerous
to the lives of others").
48. See N.M. U.J.L CRIM. 14-210, 14-211 (each requiring, in part, proof that the defendant "knew that his
acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to [the victim] [or any other human being]") (first
set of brackets added).
49. 100 N.M. 671, 673, 675 P.2d 120, 122 (1984). See Romero, supra note 11, at 65 (discussing the
McCrary court's reliance on jury instructions to establish the subjective knowledge requirement for first-degree
depraved mind murder).
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instructions, such that first-degree depraved mind murder requires a subjective test
while second-degree murder requires an objective test. °
The McCrarycourt found persuasive the committee commentary on the depraved
mind murder jury instruction in developing the subjective-objective test.5 The
McCrary court construed the language in the depraved mind murder jury
instruction, which provides "[t]he act of the defendant was greatly dangerous to the
lives of others, indicating a depraved mind without regard for human life... [and
that] [t]he defendant knew that his act was greatly dangerous to the lives of
others,"5 2 as requiring subjective knowledge.53 In contrast, the court construed the
language in the second-degree murder jury instruction, which provides that
"defendant knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm,"54 to require merely objective knowledge.55
Given that the accused will rarely admit to having actual knowledge, the
McCrary court stated that "whether there is a subjective knowledge of risk [is
determined] by considering 'what the defendant should realize to be the degree of
risk, in light of the surrounding circumstances which he knows."'56 If actual
knowledge of the risk is determined from what the accused should realize from his
knowledge of the surrounding circumstances, the court leaves unclear how one
determines the objective knowledge required for second-degree murder.57 Under the

50. See McCrary, 100 N.M. at 673, 675 P.2d at 122. This distinction has encountered criticism. See
Romero, supra note 11, at 60 (stating that attempts have not been successful by the courts or by the drafters of the
jury instructions to clarify the distinctions between different unintentional homicides based on differences of
culpability in risk-taking conduct).
51. See McCrary at 673, 675 P.2d at 122. The commentary to the relevant jury instruction states, "This
instruction sets forth a subjective test for 'depraved mind murder.' Second-degree murder provides an objective
test for depraved mind murder." N.M. U.J.I. CRIM. 14-203 (committee commentary).
52. N.M. U.J.I. CRIM. 14-203 (emphasis added).
53. See McCrary at 673,675 P.2d at 122. The Model Penal Code (MPC) provides that "[w]hen knowledge
of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware
of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(7) (1985) (emphasis added). Under the MPC, culpability reaching only to the level of objective knowledge
("should have known" as opposed to "actually knew") is found only in its definition of criminal negligence:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from
his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it,
considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in
the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985) (emphasis added). Thus, under the MPC, second-degree murder would
comprehend a criminal negligence standard of culpability. If this is the standard applied to second-degree murder,
then distinguishing second-degree murder from the statutory definition of involuntary manslaughter, which applies
an objective standard, becomes problematic. This MPC language is similar to that found in section 30-2-3(B) of
the New Mexico Statutes Annotated. See also supranotes 21-32 and accompanying text.
54. N.M. U.J.I. CRIm. 14-211 (emphasis added).
55. See McCrary, 100 N.M. at 673, 675 P.2d at 122. The textual distinction made is far from clear. Both
jury instructions ascribe knowledge to the actor. It is a slim distinction if the court relied solely on the difference
in language between an act "greatly dangerous to the lives of others" and an act "creating a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm" as determinative.
56. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 70
(1972)).
57. It is unclear how basing subjective, actual knowledge on what the accused should realize is
distinguishable from the objective knowledge standard. Subjective knowledge purports to require that the accused
"actually knew," but disregarded, the risk attendant to the conduct. Objective knowledge requires that the accused
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objective standard of knowledge, second-degree murder requires only proof that the
defendant "should have known" S rather than "knew"59 of the attendant risks his
conduct created, which is contrary to the express language of the second-degree
murder statute and corresponding jury instructions. ' Nevertheless, the subjectiveobjective knowledge test has been followed in later decisions involving first-degree
depraved mind murder.6 1
3. Using the Specific-General Intent Dichotomy in Determining the
Relevance of Intoxication Evidence in Homicides
In spite of the confusion over what constitutes a specific intent crime,62 the New
Mexico courts continue to follow the specific-general intent scheme to determine
whether voluntary intoxication may negate the requisite mens rea.63 Under this

"should have known" the risk, in spite of the actor's failure to perceive the risk. The McCrary court applied the
same inference that Professor Romero found so problematic with the subjective-objective knowledge distinction.
See Romero, supra note 11, at 66-67 (stating that a jury will often infer subjective realization of the risk if a
reasonable person would have been aware of the risk).
58. See State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 277, 694 P.2d 922, 925 (1985) (stating that the
erroneous jury instruction given at trial set out an objective standard, using the language "should have known"
instead of "knew," the subjective standard).
59. See N.M. U.J.I. CRIM. 14-210, 14-211.
60. The second-degree murder statute provides the source for the language used in the corresponding jury
instruction. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (requiring an actor "knows... [the] acts [if
performed] create(d] a strong probability of death or great bodily harm") (emphasis added). See also Romero, supra
note 11, at 66-67 (criticizing the committee commentary to the first-degree depraved mind murder instruction).
61. See Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 277, 694 P.2d at 925 (holding that conviction of first-degree
depraved mind murder requires proof of subjective knowledge); State v. Johnson, 103 N.M. 364, 370, 707 P.2d
1174, 1180 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating that, although the "elements of second degree murder are somewhat similar
to depraved mind murder[,] ... [d]epraved mind murder requires subjective knowledge that one's act is greatly
dangerous to the lives of others .... Second degree murder requires objective knowledge that one's acts create a
strong probability of death or great bodily harm."). The courts have applied this subjective-objective knowledge
distinction in the depraved mind murder context, which establishes second-degree murder as requiring only
objective knowledge. However, there is no indication that the courts require only an objective knowledge standard
for a second-degree murder conviction. See Romero, supra note 11. at 66. Thus, it remains unclear whether the
subjective-objective knowledge distinction is only applicable in the depraved mind murder context or extends to
second-degree murder generally.
62. This is evidenced in the New Mexico Supreme Court's difficulty with the term "specific intent" In State
v. Doe, 100 N.M. 481,484, 672 P.2d 654, 657 (1983), the court stated that the general criminal intent instruction
was not required because the elements of second-degree murder contained the "specific intent" requirement that
a defendant know that his acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. As a result, in State v.
Beach, 102 N.M. 642, 645, 699 P.2d 115, 118 (1985) overruled in part by State v. Brown, 122 N.M. 724,728,
931 P.2d 69,73 (1996), the court had to admit its use of language in Doe was confusing and clarified it by stating
that "second-degree murder... contains an element of subjective knowledge that does not require an added
showing of general criminal intent (i.e., conscious wrongdoing)." The Beach court further explained that this
"[specified] knowledge [element] is not an equivalent mental state to the intent to do a further act or achieve a
further consequence, and a knowledge element does not always make a crime one of specific intent." Id. In State
v. Abeyta, 120 N.M. 233, 242 n.5, 901 P.2d 164, 173 n.5 (1995), the court noted that Beach incorrectly classified
second-degree murder as a general intent crime. In State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148, 158 n.4, 921 P.2d 1266, 1276
n.4 (1996), the court negated the Abeyta dicta, expressly abrogating the Abeyta court's error. The Campos court
indicated that "the better wording" would be "specified mens rea" when discussing the knowledge element in
second-degree murder. Id. at 158-59, 921 P.2d at 1276-77.
63. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 157, 921 P.2d at 1275 (stating that "voluntary intoxication is only a defense
to specific-intent crimes").
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common law rationale, intoxication evidence is not relevant to the mens rea of a
general-intent crime." The Campos court has explained:
[T]he class of specific-intent crimes encompasses those crimes for which the
statutory elements include an intent to do some further act or achieve some
additional consequence....
A crime defined as requiring the mens rea of knowledge, such as seconddegree murder, does not require any further intent [to accomplish a specified
further goal] and therefore does not fall within the class of specific-intent
crimes.65
The court noted that second-degree murder includes both intentional and
unintentional killing.' Intoxication would provide a defense only to the specificintent portion of an intentional, but rash, killing (a second-degree murder).6 7
However, the defense would fail to negate the general-intent portion of such a
second-degree murder, the knowledge of the risk of death. The court reasoned that
the legislature, when amending the murder statute in 1980, intended only "to
modernize the terminology in the statute" as opposed to legislatively overruling a
long line of case law." Thus, second-degree murder continued to be a general-intent
crime for which intoxication is not a defense.6 9
Earlier, in State v. Ortega,7" the court had required a showing of intent to kill (or
a knowing disregard of the risk attendant to the defendant's dangerous conduct) to
elevate second-degree murder to first-degree felony murder." In purporting to
adhere to Ortega, the Campos court minimized the "intent to kill" language and
focused instead on the "knowing disregard of the risk" language. The Campos court
held that, because intoxication is not a defense to the general-intent crime of
second-degree murder, to which attaches the lesser mens rea of knowledge,

64. See id. at 159, 921 P.2d at 1277. General-intent crimes include crimes with a mens rea of general
criminal intent and those with a mens rea of knowledge. See id. at 159 n.5, 921 P.2d at 1277 n.5. In this footnote,
the Campos court distinguished the terms "general-intent crime" and "specific-intent crime" from the meaning of
"general criminal intent" as follows:
It is important not to confuse the phrase "general-intent crime" with that of "general criminal
intent," which is a distinct concept. General criminal intent is the term used to define the mens
rea for a crime that has no stated mens rea. This mens rea is defined as concious wrongdoing
or the purposeful doing of an act that the law declares to be a crime. The class of general-intent
crimes on the other hand is best defined as those crimes which are not specific-intent crimes,
which would include both crimes with a mens rea of general criminal intent and those with a
mens rea of knowledge.
Id. at 159 n.5, 921 P.2d at 1277 n.5 (citations omitted).
65. 1& at 159, 921 P.2d 1277. Employing this traditional analysis, the Campos court held that intoxication
is not a defense to second-degree murder, since it is a general intent crime with a mens tea of knowledge. See id.
at 157, 921 P.2d at 1275.
66. See id. at 160, 921 P.2d at 1278.
67. See State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 837 P.2d 862 (1992) (holding that second-degree murder includes
intentional killings that lack deliberation and premeditation which are committed with the killer's knowledge that
his acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm); State v. Johnson, 103 N.M. 364, 707 P.2d 1174
(Ct. App. 1985) (holding that second-degree murder does not exclude intentional murders).
68. Campos, 122 N.M. at 160,921 P.2d at 1278.
69. See id.
70. 112N.M.554,817P.2d 1196(1991).
71. See id. at 563, 817 P.2d at 1205.
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intoxication is, therefore, not a defense for first-degree felony murder.7 2 Only for
crimes requiring proof of specific intent 73 may the fact finder consider whether the
intoxication was so great that the specific intent could not have been formed.74
The Campos court noted that some states have statutorily barred the use of the
intoxication defense to knowledge crimes, such as second-degree murder.75 The
court also pointed out that, of those states that allow intoxication to negate
knowledge, "many still hold that the defense is inapplicable to second-degree
murder because, under their statutes, second-degree murder also includes the lesser
mens rea element of recklessness," for which intoxication is no defense.76
C. The U.S. Supreme Court'sImpact on New Mexico's Homicide Jurisprudence
United States Supreme Court decisions have focused the New Mexico courts'
attention upon the mens rea elements of the state's homicide statutes." In 1970, the
United States Supreme Court, in In re Winship,78 explicitly held that "the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."7 9 In Mullaney v. Wilbur,80 the Court held that the Due Process Clause
requires the state to carry the ultimate burden of persuasion by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."' The prosecution cannot shift the burden to the defendant beyond
requiring the defendant to present some evidence to rebut an otherwise presumed
or inferred fact at issue.82 The Court, in Sandstrom v. Montana, 3 held that, where
the mens rea element of the crime was at issue, an instruction stating that "the law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts"8 4
could have been interpreted as a conclusive presumption or as impermissibly
shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant.8 5 The instruction's ambiguity

72. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 160-61,921 P.2d at 1277-78 (citing Ortega, 112 N.M. at 564-65, 817 P.2d
at 1206-07).
73. First-degree willful, deliberate and premeditated murder is an example. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1A(l) (Repl. Pamp. 1994). See also supra note 20 and accompanying text (excerpting the statute's relevant
language).
74. See State v. Tapia, 81 N.M. 274, 276,466 P.2d 551, 553 (1970). It must be noted that:
[T]o authorize an instruction on intoxication the record must contain some evidence showing
or tending to show that [the] defendant consumed an intoxicant and the intoxicant affected his
mental state at or near the time of the homicide. In deciding whether the instruction is proper,
the trial court must not weigh the evidence, but must simply determine whether such evidence
exists.
State v. Privett, 104 N.M. 79,82, 717 P.2d 55, 58 (1986) (citation omitted). Thus, where intoxication is relevant
to the offense charged, the defendant must merely present some evidence that his mental state was affected by the
intoxicant to justify such an instruction.
75. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 161, 9231 P.2d at 1279.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., id. at 159, 921 P.2d 1277 (citing Sandstrom v. Montanta, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)); State v.
Brown, 122 N.M. 724,731-32, 931 P.2d 69, 76-77 (1996) (citations omitted).
78. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
79. See id. at 364.
80. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
81. See id. at 701-02.
82. Id.
83. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
at 513.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 524.
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violated the Due Process Clause requirement that the state must prove every
element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and was thus found
unconstitutional.86
As a result of these decisions, New Mexico courts have sought to clarify the
homicide statutes to provide guidance as to the proof required to adequately
establish or rebut the mens rea element of each crime. After State v. Campos,87 but
before the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Brown,88 the United States
Supreme Court issued its decision in Montana v. Egelhoff,89 a plurality decision.9 °
The United States Supreme Court in Egelhoff upheld a Montana statute that
disallowed consideration of a defendant's intoxicated condition when a defendant's
state of mind is at issue. 91
Justice Scalia, speaking for a plurality, defended the constitutionality of the
Montana statute. 92 He did so on the ground that the Due Process Clause places
limits on the restriction of the right to introduce evidence, but only where such
restriction "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. 93 Justice Scalia
determined that the defendant had failed to establish the rule (allowing a jury to
consider evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication, where relevant to mens
rea) as fundamental and deeply rooted in our traditions.9 4 Justice Scalia referenced
the lengthy common law tradition that rejects intoxication as an excuse or
justification for crime as undermining the defendant's position.9 5 According to
Justice Scalia, as a rule of evidence rooted in the common law with valid
justifications today,' the Montana statute does not "violate a fundamental principle

86. See id.
87. 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266 (1996).
88. 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69(1996).
89. 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
90. The New Mexico Supreme Court decided Campos, 122 N.M. 148,921 P.2d 1266 (1996), on May 30,
1996. Chief Justice Frost authored the majority opinion, Justices Ransom, Baca and Minzner concurred in the
opinion, and Justice Franchini wrote a dissenting opinion. The United States Supreme Court decided Egelhoff, 518
U.S. 37 (1996), two weeks later, on June 13, 1996. Responding to Egelhoff, Campos sought rehearing before the
New Mexico Supreme Court, which was denied on July 24, 1996. About six months after Egelhoff and a little over
four months after Campos was denied a rehearing, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Brown, 122 N.M. 724,
931 P.2d 69 (1996), on December 5, 1996. Justice Franchini wrote the majority opinion, Justices Ransom and
McKinnon concurred, and Justice Minzner, joined by now Chief Justice Baca, dissented.
91. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 56. The statute's relevant mens sea was identified as either purposely or
knowingly causing another's death. See id. at 54. In so doing, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Montana Supreme Court, reinstating the defendant's conviction, a conviction which the Montana Supreme Court
had previously reversed. See id at 41, 56. The Montana Supreme Court had reasoned that the defendant had a right,
under the Due Process Clause, "to present and have considered by the jury all relevant evidence to rebut the State's
evidence on all elements of the offense charged" (deliberate homicide, in that case). Id. at 41 (quoting State v.
Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 266 (Mont. 1995)). Evidence of intoxication was "clear[ly] ... relevant to the issue of
whether [the defendant] acted knowingly and purposely." Id. (quoting Egelhoff, 900 P.2d at 265). Thus, the
Montana Supreme Court concluded that the Montana statute had prevented the jury from considering that evidence,
relieving the State of part of its burden of proof, and therefore denying the defendant due process. See id.
92. See id. at 42-43.
93. Id. at 43 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)).
94. See id. at 48.
95. See id. at 44-51.
96. See id. at51.
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of fairness."97 Thus, it is within the state's power to reduce its burden of proof in
this way. 8
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment only, concluded that the statute
should not be categorized as simply an evidentiary rule designed to exclude relevant
exculpatory evidence. 9 She viewed the statute as a legislative judgment redefining
mens rea, thus encountering "no constitutional shoal."'' According to Justice
Ginsburg:
"[A] state legislature certainly has the authority to identify the elements of the
offenses it wishes to punish,"'' 1 and to exclude evidence irrelevant to the crime
it has defined.
"[T]he applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard... has always been
'
dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged. '""e
..States enjoy a wide latitude in defining the elements of criminal offenses,
particularly when determining "the extent to which moral culpability should be
a prerequisite to conviction.""1 3
Dissenting, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer,
supported the Montana Supreme Court's determination that the statute violated due
process."° O'Connor's dissent considered it unconstitutional to prevent a jury from
considering evidence relevant to determine the defendant's mental state, where the
mental state is an essential element of the offense that must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. 5 In Justice O'Connor's view, by disallowing evidence that might
negate an essential element, Montana eases the State's burden to prove its case. 1"
Thus, the State's desire to increase its chances of conviction of a class of
defendants, who might otherwise be able to successfully rebut a requisite element
of the offense, "violate[s] the due process right to present a defense."' 7
Montana v. Egelhoff is the United States Supreme Court's most recent case on
the constitutional due process requirements regarding the mens rea elements of state
criminal statutes. Five Justices view the Montana statute as a violation of the
Constitution's Due Process Clause, if characterized as an evidentiary rule. 0 8 Thus,
Egelhoff may prove crucial to the New Mexico Supreme Court's proper reading of
the mens rea elements of New Mexico's homicide statutes.

97. Id. at 55.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 57 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
100. Id. By "constitutional shoal," Justice Ginsburg suggests that, absent a legislative judgment redefining
mens rea, due process may be violated when evidence that could negate the mens rea element of the offense is
disallowed.
101. Id. (quoting Justice O'Connor's dissent, id. at 71.
102. Id. at 58 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 n.12 (1977)).
103. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 545 (1968)).
104. See id. at 61-73.
105. See id. at 61.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 61-62 (citing State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 265 (Mont. 1995)).
108. See id. at 57-61 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 61-73 (O'Connor, J., with whom Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer join, dissenting).
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IV. RATIONALE OF THE BROWN COURT
In Brown, the defendant appealed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that
"Brown's intoxication could be considered in determining the mental state required
for conviction of depraved mind murder."' 9 The court needed to clearly identify the
mens rea element of first-degree depraved mind murder and then decide whether
evidence of intoxication was relevant to the existence of that mens rea element."10
The Brown court held that the mens rea element of subjective knowledge was an
essential element of first-degree depraved mind murder."' Thus, where evidence of
intoxication is presented, the jury may consider such evidence in determining
subjective knowledge for a first-degree
whether the accused possessed the requisite
2
depraved mind murder conviction."
Subjective Knowledge is an Essential Element of First-DegreeDepraved
Mind Murder
As justification for first-degree depraved mind murder's subjective knowledge
requirement,"' the Brown court pointed to the fact that "New Mexico is one of only
a few states that divides unintentional murder based upon risk-creating conduct into
two degrees of homicide, first-degree depraved mind murder and second degree
murder.""' 4 Because first-degree murder carries far more serious penal
consequences than second-degree murder,"' the Brown court inferred the
legislature's intention to distinguish between first-degree depraved mind murder
and second-degree murder." 6 The court considered it "of the utmost importance in
the administration of New Mexico's criminal justice system" to provide a sufficient
distinction between the two offenses."' The prior distinction had been based on
"the number of persons subjected to the risk of death." ' The Brown court
considered this distinction not determinative in differentiating between first- and
second-degree murder." 9 With the legislature having placed depraved mind murder
20
within the most culpable class of homicides, carrying grave penal consequences,
A.

109. State v. Brown, 122 N.M. 724, 725, 931 P.2d 69, 70 (1996).
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 721-22, 730, 931 P.2d at 71-72, 75.
See id. at 726-27, 931 P.2d at 71-72.
See id. at 728, 931 P.2d at 73.

113. See id. at 726-27, 931 P.2d at 71-72.
114. Id. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72 (citing Romero, supra note 11, at 61); see also supra note 24 and

accompanying text. Depraved mind murder is a first-degree murder in New Mexico, Colorado and Washington.
115.

See id. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72 (citing Romero, supra note 11, at 61); see also supra note 24 and

accompanying text. New Mexico is one of only a few states where depraved mind murder is a capital felony. Firstdegree depraved mind murder is a capital crime in New Mexico and Colorado. Washington defines the offense as
a class A felony and is not, without more, a capital crime.
116. Seeid.

117. Id. (citing State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 272, 837 P.2d 862, 865 (1992)).
118. !d (citing both State v. Sena, 99 N.M. 272, 274, 657 P.2d 128, 130 (1983), and State v. DeSantos, 89

N.M. 458, 461, 553 P.2d 1265, 1268 (1976)).
119. Brown, 122 N.M. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72 (citing Romero, supra note 11, at 63-65).
120. See id (citing State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 272, 837 P.2d 862, 865 (1992)). The court also noted that

"clear, principled distinctions ... result in the more heinous conduct being punished more severely." Id. (citing
Romero, supra note 11, at 60).
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the court inferred that the legislature ascribed "an intensified malice or evil intent"
to depraved mind murder.'2 1
The text of the first-degree depraved mind murder provision does not expressly
provide that the killing be committed with the knowledge of the high degree of risk
attendant to the defendant's conduct.' 2 2 Instead, the court relied on a number of
earlier decisions which held that depraved mind murder requires "proof that the
defendant had 'subjective knowledge' that his or her act was extremely dangerous
to the lives of others.' 23 This is in contrast to the mens rea element of seconddegree murder, which requires only an objective knowledge of the risk and no
required showing of an intensified evil intent.'24 The court reasoned that "the
required mens rea element of 'subjective knowledge' serves as proof that the
defendant acted with a 'depraved mind' . . . and with utter disregard for human
life."'25 Following McCrary,the Brown court continued to rely upon the first-degree
depraved mind murder jury instruction and committee commentary as persuasive
support for
the subjective knowledge requirement for first-degree depraved mind
26
murder.
B.

Intoxication is Relevant to Proving the Subjective Knowledge Mens Rea
Requirement in First-DegreeDepravedMind Murder
The Brown court found that intoxication is relevant to determine the existence
of the mens rea element of subjective knowledge and is thus a valid consideration
for the fact finder. 27 In line with the due process requirements of the Constitution,
the Brown court found that the State's burden of proving each element of firstdegree depraved mind murder beyond a reasonable doubt necessitates proving the
subjective knowledge mens rea element. 28 The court defined intoxication as "a
disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of
substances into the body."'2 9 Intoxication, as so defined, could affect an actor's

121. Id. (citing State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammnad, 102 N.M. 274, 278, 694 P.2d 922, 926 (1985), and State v.
Johnson, 103 N.M. 364, 368, 707 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Ct. App. 1985)). These cases identified depraved mind murder
as requiring outrageous and extreme recklessness performed with a depraved kind of wantonness and evidencing
total indifference for the value of human life. See id.
122. See N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 30-2-1(A)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1994) ("[T]he killing of one human being by another
without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused.., by any act greatly
dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life.").
123. Brown, 122 N.M. at 728,931 P.2d at 73 (citing Jbn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 277,694 P.2d at
925, State v. McCrary, 100 N.M. 671, 673, 675 P.2d 120, 122 (1984), and Johnson, 103 N.M. at 368, 707 P.2d
at 1178).
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 728,931 P.2d at 73 (citing N.M. U.J.I.
14-203 (with committee commentary)).
For excerpts of the instruction and commentary, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. The Brown court
stated that, in order to satisfy the subjective knowledge mens rea requirement for first-degree depraved mind
murder, the defendant "must have had the subjective or actual knowledge of the high degree of risk involved in his
conduct." Brown, 122 N.M. at 728, 931 P.2d at 73. To review the mens rea subjective-objective standards, see
supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
127. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 733, 931 P.2d at 78.
128. See id. at 728,931 P.2d at 73. For a review of the relevant U.S. Supreme Court's due process criminal
cases which influenced the Brown analysis, see supra notes 77-86, 91-107 and accompanying text,
129. Brown, 122 N.M. at 729, 931 P.2d at 74 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(a) (1985)).
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3
ability to form the mens rea of subjective knowledge. ' The court recognized that,
by the turn of the century, New Mexico, along with "most American jurisdictions,"
had moved away from the earlier harshness of the strict policy that "voluntary
intoxication provided no defense to a criminal act."'' Instead, New Mexico courts
to be
"had adopted the common-law approach which permitted intoxication
32 Under this
intent."'
considered where it negates the required element of specific
only for
specific-general intent approach, voluntary intoxication is "a consideration
33
murder."'
specific-intentcrimes, including premeditated first-degree
While the Brown court denied wholly abandoning New Mexico's specificgeneral intent analysis with respect to all offenses, it held that this analysis does not
apply to depraved mind murder."3 The court explained its departure by noting that
the specific-general intent approach has been criticized for the difficulties in
identifying "whether a particular offense was a specific-intent crime or a generalintent crime.""' The court also viewed the Brown case as presenting a unique
circumstance involving a first-degree offense with the express mental state of
subjective knowledge.' 36 According to the Brown court, this peculiarity arose from
the statutory changes in 1980, which New Mexico courts interpreted as the
required for firstlegislature's effort to redefine and distinguish the mental states
3 7 The Brown court
murder.
second-degree
and
degree depraved mind murder
not take into
opined that "[tlhe specific-general intent common-law approach does
intent.' 3 8
specific
from
aside
rea
mens
'heightened'
a
of
existence
consideration the
The court reasoned that "[t]he capacity to possess 'subjective knowledge' may be
just as affected by intoxication as the capacity to intend to do a further act[,
person is
...[whereas] [i]ntoxication . . .usually has no effect on whether a '39
On this
crime."
general-intent
a
be...
to
declared
purposefully doing something
'specific-intent'
a
considered
be
cannot
murder
mind
basis, although "depraved
it does not fall
crime because it requires proof of 'subjective knowledge,'.

130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. (emphasis added); see also supra notes 3-4, 62-76 and accompanying text (discussing the
specific-general intent rationale as defined by previous courts, and how it applies to voluntary intoxication). The
Brown court described a general-intent crime as "requir[ing] only a 'conscious wrongdoing,' or 'the purposeful
doing of an act that the law declare[d] to be a crime."' Id. (quoting State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274,
278, 694 P.2d 922, 926 (1985)). Note that the apparent distinction between general criminal intent and generalintent crimes made in Campos, decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court on May 30, 1996, is not precisely
followed in Brown, decided by the same court on December 5, 1996. Compare State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148,
159 n.5, 921 P.2d 1266, 1277 n.5 (1996) (identifying general criminal intent as defining the mens rea for a crime
lacking a stated mens rea and defining general intent crimes as including crimes with a mens rea of either general
criminal intent or knowledge), with Brown, 122 N.M. at 729, 931 P.2d at 74 (including within the class of general
intent crimes only those with a general criminal intent). See also supranotes 64-65 and accompanying text, for the
Brown
Campos court's treatment of the specific-general intent rationale. In contrast with the Campos court, the
Compare
crime.
intent
general
of
a
rea
mens
the
of
definition
its
in
component
knowledge
the
court fails to include
Campos, 122 N.M. at 159 n.5, 921 P.2d at 1277 n.5 with Brown, 122 N.M. at 729-31, 931 P.2d at 74-76.
134. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 730, 931 P.2d at 75.
135. Id. at 729, 931 P.2d at 74 (citing G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 846, 849-50 (1978), and
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 65(e), at 297-300 (1984)).
136. See id. at 730, 931 P.2d at 75.
137. See id.
138. Id. (citing ROBINSON, supra note 135, § 65(e), at 300).
139. Id.
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squarely among the class of crimes referred to as the 'general-intent' crimes."'"
Therefore, the Brown court considered "evidence of intoxication relevant to the
formation of the heightened mens rea element of depraved mind murder," absent
any expression from the legislature to the contrary.' 4 '
The Brown court found support for its subjective-objective knowledge mens rea
distinctions in the Egelhoff dissent's due process analysis.'4 2 The Brown court
particularly noted that Justice O'Connor (joined by three other Justices) considered
intoxication evidence relevant in negating a subjective mental state element (i.e.,
knowledge) of the offense. 14 3 While the Egelhoff plurality opinion is inapplicable
to Brown's case, the court found Justice O'Connor's dissent significant to Brown's
analysis because, "[u]nlike Montana, the New Mexico legislature has not chosen to
redefine its elements with the enactment of a rule that excludes relevant evidence
of voluntary intoxication."1"
The Brown court recognized that other jurisdictions generally disallow
drunkenness to negate the depraved mind murder mens rea by "blotting out
consciousness of risk."'4 5 However, the court distinguished New Mexico from other
jurisdictions.'4 6 It did so on the basis of "New Mexico's unique position requiring
a subjective knowledge element to establish depraved mind murder as well as its
unique classification of depraved mind murder as first-degree murder." 47 With New
Mexico's unique statutory scheme, the court posited that, since intoxication is
"clearly relevant" to the formation of the requisite subjective knowledge mental
state, the defendant must be allowed to rebut the existence of subjective knowledge
with evidence of intoxication.'4 8 Thus, the court held that "evidence of intoxication
may be considered to reduce first-degree depraved mind murder to second-degree
murder," but "[i]t may not be used... to reduce second-degree murder to voluntary
manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter or to completely excuse a defendant
from the consequences of his unlawful act."' 49
V. ANALYSIS
In Brown, the New Mexico Supreme Court attempted to formulate clear,
principled distinctions between first-degree depraved mind murder and second-

140. Id. at 730-31, 931 P.2d at 75-76.
141. Id. at 731, 931 P.2d at 76. The Brown court further states: "[lIt is for the jury to weigh the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to be given that evidence. Moreover, such concerns should not lessen the state's
burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, all elements of the offense." Id.
142. See id. (citing Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 61-73 (1996) (O'Connor, J., with whom Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer join, dissenting)). See also supranotes 89-108 and accompanying text.
143. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 731, 931 P.2d at 76.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 732, 931 P.2d at 77.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 733, 931 P.2d at 78. The court found Brown's intoxication evidence highly relevant to the issue
of whether Brown had actually possessed a subjective realization of the risk at the time of the shooting. See id. at
732, 931 P.2d at 77. The court specifically mentioned as probative, the evidence that Brown had: (1) consumed
an excessive amount of alcohol on the day of the homicide, (2) failed to show any rancor toward the victim, and
(3) exhibited apparent confusion in the aftermath of the murder. See id.
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degree murder. " ° Admittedly, the task is particularly problematic because of New
Mexico's peculiar statutory homicide scheme."' It is laudable that the court
attempted to reserve convictions for first-degree depraved mind murder, with its
52
extreme punishment, for only those defendants with a clearly elevated mens rea.'
However, the court's departure from traditional analysis may confuse rather than
improve New Mexico's homicide scheme.'
The subjective-objective knowledge distinction, as developed by New Mexico
courts, is far from clear. Both subjective knowledge and objective knowledge
involve what an actor shouldhave known. " With elements of an actor's knowledge
being inferred in both instances, it may be difficult for judges to fashion, or
practitioners discern, a workable bright-line distinction between the subjective
knowledge requisite of first-degree depraved mind murder and the objective
knowledge standard of second-degree murder.
The Brown court's subjective-objective knowledge distinction is not the
opinion's only shortcoming. 55 The Brown court's due process concerns were
depraved mind murder
influential in the court's creation of the first-degree
56 By excepting first-degree
exception to the specific-general intent analysis.'
depraved mind murder from the traditional specific-general intent analysis, it is

150. See id at 727,931 P.2d at 72. However, the dissenting opinion questioned the majority opinion's use
of the phrase "subjective or actual knowledge." See id. at 734, 931 P.2d at 79 (Minzner, J., dissenting). Justice
Minzner found the underlying question to be whether the intoxication evidence was sufficient to show that, "if
[Brown] fired intentionally, he could have done so without the actual knowledge that his act was greatly dangerous
to others." Id. Justice Minzner suggests that lack of memory does not establish an inability to know, at the time of
the conduct, the highly risky nature of his conduct. See id. While admitting that the court has "produced a body
of law that provides the thinnest of distinctions between depraved-mind murder and second-degree murder," Justice
Minzner does not see the majority opinion's rationale in Brown as improving the law. Id. She apparently found
preferable the rationale that applied the distinction based on the number of persons placed at risk in conjunction
with the specific-general intent analysis. See id. at 735, 931 P.2d at 80.
151. See id. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72 (noting that New Mexico is one of only a few states with first-degree
depraved mind murder); see also Romero, supra note 11, at 56-57 (enumerating the degrees of criminal homicide,
intentional and unintentional homicide). The four degrees of unintentional homicide are: (1) first-degree murder
(felony murder and depraved mind murder), see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-2-1(A)(2), 30-2-1(A)(3) (Repl. Pamp.
1994); (2) second-degree murder, see N. M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1994); (3) involuntary
manslaughter (misdemeanor manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide), see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3(B)
(Repl. Pamp. 1994); and (4) vehicular homicide, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-101 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
152. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72.
153. The Brown court eliminated the distinction based on the number of persons subjected to the risk of death
and found the specific-general intent analysis inapplicable to first-degree depraved mind murder. See id. at 727,
730-31, 931 P.2d at 72, 75-76. In so doing, the court placed first-degree depraved mind murder outside the
developed body of law, leaving the offense distinguished by the unrefined subjective-objective knowledge
distinction. See id. at 730-31, 931 P.2d at 75-76.
154. In practice, subjective knowledge of a risk is based on a "double imputation," whereas objective
knowledge is based on a "single imputation." Subjective knowledge is imputed to the actor for what the actor
should have known about the risk of causing a death, given his knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his
conduct. However, the actor's knowledge of the circumstances is most likely necessarily inferred. Thus a double
imputation may be the basis for a finding of subjective knowledge. See State v. McCrary, 100 N.M. 671, 673, 675
P.2d 120, 122 (1984); see also supranotes 49-61 and accompanying text. Objective knowledge of a risk of death
is based on what the actor should have known based on facts that a reasonable person should have known. Thus,
a single imputation is the basis of objective knowledge; see State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 277,
694 P.2d 922, 925 (1985); see also supranotes 58, 61 and accompanying text.
155. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 734, 931 P.2d at 79 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
156. The Brown court's due process concerns reflect approval of the Egelhoff dissent's due process analysis.
See id. at 731-32, 931 P.2d 76-77 (citing Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996)).
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difficult to justify the continued use of the specific-general intent analysis in
determining the relevance of intoxication to first-degree felony murder, which
requires a mens rea of "knowing" and presents the same due process concerns. 157
Where a second-degree murder is elevated to first-degree murder under the felony
murder rule, only "objective knowledge" is required. 8 Under the Brown analysis,
the culpability attached to such a second-degree murder offense does not necessarily
correlate with the punishment received. 5 9
A.

The Subjective-Objective Knowledge Distinction is Unclear
The Brown court found the subjective-objective knowledge distinction, rather
than the multiple person/single person distinction, determinative in differentiating
the mens rea of first-degree depraved mind murder from second-degree murder. 160
The Brown court relied on McCrary and its progeny for the requirement of
subjective knowledge to reflect the increased culpability implied by the legislature's
classification of depraved mind murder as a first-degree murder.' 6'
The McCrarycourt stated that the subjective knowledge required for first-degree
depraved mind murder did not require that the actor actually know that someone
was placed at risk by the conduct. 62 Rather it required, under the circumstances
known by the actor, the conduct was so risky that the actor should have realizedthe
63
very high degree of risk.
In adopting the earlier courts' "subjective knowledge" terminology, the Brown
court failed to clarify the definitions of "subjective knowledge" and "objective

157. First-degree murder includes first-degree willful, deliberate, premeditated (WDP) murder, first-degree
felony murder, and first-degree depraved mind murder. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A) (Repi. Pamp. 1994).
After Brown, first-degree felony murder is assigned the most serious of penal consequences on the basis of
objective knowledge, for which intoxication is inelevant, under the specific-general intent analysis. Under Brown's
due process analysis, given second-degree murder's statutory "knowledge" element and felony murder's designation
as a first-degree murder, due process concerns arise when intoxication is deemed irrelevant to proving the mens
rea element of first-degree felony murder.
158. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 728, 931 P.2d at 73.
159. See id. at 733-735, 931 P.2d at 78-80. As Justice Minzner states in her dissent:
If intoxication is a defense to depraved-mind murder, [one has] difficulty understanding why
it is not a defense to second-degree murder, at least on these facts. Yet in State v. Campos, [the
court] very clearly said it was not.... If [the court] recognize[s] the defense here, [the court]
ha[s] a difficult time reconciling not only Campos, but also explaining why intoxication is not
a defense to voluntary manslaughter.
Id. at 735.
160. See State v. Brown, 122 N.M. 724, 727, 931 P.2d 69,72
(1996). The court noted earlier decisions that had found the "number of persons at risk" distinction deterninative.
See id. (citing State v. Sena, 99 N.M. 272, 274, 657 P.2d 128, 130 (1983); State v. DeSantos, 89 N.M. 458, 461,
553 P.2d 1265, 1268 (1976)).
161. In its discussion, the Brown court considered the following cases: State v. Omar-Muhammad, 105 N.M.
788, 737 P.2d 1165 (1987); State v. lbn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 694 P.2d 922 (1985); State v. McCrary,
100 N.M. 671, 675 P.2d 120 (1984); State v. Johnson, 103 N.M. 364, 707 P.2d 1174 (Ct. App. 1985)). See id. at
728, 931 P.2d at 73. See also supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
162. See McCrary, 100 N.M. at 673, 675 P.2d at 122 (1984) (citing LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 56, § 70).
163. See id. See also Romero, supra note 11, at 67 ("Although the [McCrary] court viewed a reasonable
person's awareness as proof of what the defendant subjectively realized, the court has not adopted a negligence
standard of objective knowledge [for first-degree depraved mind murder]."); supra notes 49-61 and accompanying
text.
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knowledge."'' " The court indicated that in first-degree depraved mind murder, the
defendant "must have had the subjective or actual knowledge of the high degree of
risk involved in his conduct."' 65
Two problems arise, however, if subjective knowledge is determined as
described in McCrary."6 It is unclear what is meant by67second-degree murder's
"objective knowledge" in light of the statutory language. It is also uncertain how
such "objective knowledge" is to be distinguished from involuntary manslaughter's
objective standard of "criminal negligence.' 6' Thus, either (1) the mens rea of
second-degree murder requires some sort of subjective knowledge, in which case
there is no identifiable mens rea distinction between first-degree depraved mind
murder and second-degree murder; or alternatively, (2) second degree murder
requires a mens rea of objective knowledge, in which case there is no mens rea
distinction between second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. In
attempting to make a clear distinction between first-degree depraved mind murder
and second-degree murder, the Brown court, in effect, made second-degree murder
indistinguishable from involuntary manslaughter, if the offenses are to be
distinguished on the basis of culpability. 69
164. See Romero, supra note 11, at 65-68. Professor Romero criticizes the use of an objective test ("what
the reasonable person would have known under the circumstances") for second-degree murder and suggests that
there is "doubtful authority" to support the proposition that a negligence standard "is sufficient for second-degree
murder." Id. at 65.
165. Brown, 122 N.M. at 728, 931 P.2d at 73 (emphasis omitted).
166. See McCrary, 100 N.M. at 673, 675 P.2d at 122.
167. See N.M. UJ.L CRIM. 14-203 (requiring for first-degree depraved mind murder that the actor "knew that
his act was greatly dangerous to the lives of others") (emphasis added); N.M. U.J.I CRIM. 14-210, 211 (requiring
for second degree murder that the actor "knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm") (emphasis added); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (providing that first-degree
depraved mind murder is "the killing of one human being by another... by any act greatly dangerous to the lives
of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (B) (Repl. Pamp. 1994)
(providing that "a person who kills another human being... commits murder in the second degree if in performing
the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to
that individual or another") (emphasis added); see also Romero, supra note 11, at 67-68 (discussing the difficulties
with the posed mens rea standards for depraved mind murder and second-degree murder). Professor Romero was
concerned about the lack of distinction between first-degree depraved mind murder and second-degree murder since
both seemed to require subjective knowledge, following the language of the statute and relevant jury instructions.
To the extent that Brown overruled State v. Beach, 102 N.M. 642, 699 P.2d 115 (1985), overruled, in part, by State
v. Brown, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69 (1996), in holding that second-degree murder does not require subjective
knowledge, the concern becomes differentiating this "objective knowledge" mental state from the mens rea of
involuntary manslaughter. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 728, 931 P.2d at 73.
168. See State v. Yarborough,122 N.M. 596, 603, 930 P.2d 131, 138 (1996) (holding involuntary
manslaughter requires at least a mens rea of criminal negligence). Criminal negligence is reckless, wanton or willful
conduct showing a disregard of the consequences. See id. at 600, 930 P.2d at 135. An objective standard is applied
to the mens rea element of involuntary manslaughter, such that the actor is culpable for what he should have known
would be the risk attaching to his conduct. See N.M. UJ.I. CRIM. 14-231; see also supra notes 30-32.
169. Prior to Brown, the New Mexico Supreme Court had yet to adopt an objective knowledge standard for
any murder. See Romero, supra note 11, at 68. Professor Romero noted that, in McCrary, the New Mexico
Supreme Court had viewed an ordinary person's awareness, under the same circumstances in which the defendant
knowingly found himself, as proof of what the defendant subjectively realized. See id. at 67. Professor Romero
found the use of such inference as proof of subjective knowledge for first-degree depraved mind murder was not
the equivalent of adopting an objective knowledge negligence standard for first-degree depraved mind murder. See
id. Professor Romero referred to two cases, indicating that the New Mexico Supreme Court required actual
knowledge for the mens rea of second-degree murder. See id. In his discussion, he considered the implications of
Beach and State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 481, 672 P.2d 654 (1983), as supporting a subjective knowledge requirement
for second-degree murder. See Romero, supra note 11, at 67. However, the Brown decision altered the New

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

Either second-degree murder has the same "knowing" mens rea as first-degree
depraved mind, as the statutory language would suggest, both requiring subjective
knowledge, or second-degree murder has the objective knowledge mens rea as does
involuntary manslaughter. Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court has failed to
provide clear and workable definitions of "objective knowledge" and "subjective
knowledge."
B.

The Subjective-Objective Knowledge Distinction Failsto Provide a More
PrincipledHomicide Scheme
New Mexico courts and the Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions have relied
heavily on the LaFave & Scott treatise in developing distinctions between the mens
rea requirements for the degrees of murder. 7 ° However, this treatise's discussion
of depraved mind murder distinguished murder from manslaughter, not degrees of
murder.' Furthermore, according to Professor Romero, the drafters of the firstdegree depraved mind murder uniform jury instruction "lifted a sentence out of
context and mistakenly assumed that the treatise supports an objective standard for
second degree murder."'7 Thus, the proposition stated in the committee's
commentary to the first-degree depraved mind murder jury instruction was
mistakenly attributed to an authority that actually supported the opposite
proposition: that second-degree murder should require a subjective realization.'
In turn, New Mexico courts have continued to propagate this error in first-degree
depraved mind murder decisions."
Mexico Supreme Court's implied position with its express overruling of Beach, to the extent that Beach held that
second-degree murder contains a subjective knowledge element. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 728, 931 P.2d at 73
(overruling, in part, Beach, 102 N.M. at 645, 699 P.2d at 118). The Brown decision establishes that, while firstdegree depraved mind murder clearly has a subjective knowledge mens rea element, second-degree murder does
not. Under the objective mens rea standard, the defendant's state of the awareness was irrelevant. Thus, the
objective mens rea element of second-degree murder is indistinguishable from the mens rea element of involuntary
manslaughter.
170. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text (relying on LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 56, § 70).
171. See LAFAVE & ScowT, supra note 56, § 70 at 542. "Grossly negligent conduct, or reckless conduct,
which results in death may serve as the basis for manslaughter liability, but it will not do for murder." Id.
172. See Romero, supra note 11, at 67. The committee commentary quotes the following LAFAVE & SCOTt
passage:
[M]ost depraved-heart murder cases do not require a determination of the issue of whether the
defendant actually was aware of the risk entailed by his conduct; his conduct was very risky and
he himself was reasonable enough to know it to be so. It is only the unusual case which raises
the issue--where the defendant is more absent-minded, stupid or intoxicated than the reasonable
man.
N.M. U.J.I. CRIM. 14-203 (committee commentary)(quoting LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 56, § 70 at 544).
The excerpted passage does not support the committee commentary's statement that "[s]econd-degree murder
provides an objective test for depraved mind murder." Id. Rather, the excerpted passage indicates "that the issue
of subjective versus objective knowledge of the risk will not arise very often because a jury will often infer
subjective realization of the risk if a reasonable person would have been aware of the risk." Romero, supra note
11, at 66-67. This is similair to the reasoning found in State v. McCrary, 100 N.M. 671, 673, 675 P.2d 120, 122
(1984), regarding the mechanics of how a jury decides whether the actor possessed subjective knowledge of risk.
The treatise dealing with depraved mind murder actually concludes: "[flt would seem that, to convict of murder,
with its drastic penal consequences, subjective realization should be required." LAFAVE & SCOT, supra note 56,
§ 70 at 544; see also Romero, supra note 11, at 67.
173. See Romero, supra note 11, at 66-67 (citing N.M. U.J.I. CiuM. 14-203 (committee commentary) and
LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 56, § 70 at 544).
174. See supra notes 60-61, 122-23 and accompanying text.
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The subjective-objective knowledge discussion has been limited to the mens rea
distinction between first-degree depraved mind murder and the lesser included
offense of second-degree murder. In Brown, the New Mexico Supreme Court
expressly accepted the first-degree depraved-mind murder uniform jury instruction
committee commentary's subjective-objective construction of the first-degree
depraved mind murder statute.'75 The impact of Brown goes beyond distinguishing
first-degree depraved mind murder from second-degree murder because the
76
objective knowledge standard is generally applicable to second-degree murder.
This objective standard is in direct opposition to the language of the second degree
murder statute and the corresponding jury instruction, both of which use the term
77
"knows" to describe the actor's awareness of the risk his acts create. Moreover,
the Ortega court held that the mens rea required for a felony murder (which would
constitute second-degree murder committed during a first-degree or inherently
dangerous felony) necessitates proof of "an intent to kill in the form of knowledge
that the defendant's acts 'create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm.'"t

178

New Mexico's statutory homicide scheme should require subjective knowledge
as the mens rea element wherever a homicide statute expressly requires an actor's79
"knowledge" within the offense to avoid offending the Due Process Clause.
Under such analysis, the Brown court's requirement that the existence of
175. See State v. Brown, 122 N.M. 724, 728,931 P.2d 69, 73 (1996).
176. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1994). As defined in the murder statute, second-degree
murder is a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. See id. Since first-degree murder includes willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder, felony murder and depraved mind murder, second-degree murder, as
legislatively defined, encompasses all the attributes of the lesser included offenses of first-degree murders. See id.
Second-degree murder includes: (1) the intentional killing lacking deliberation and premeditation, see e.g., State
v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 837 P.2d 862 (1992); (2) a murder (intentional, but rash, or unintentional) not resulting
during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony, where the actor intended to kill or knew that his riskcreating conduct created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, see e.g., State v. Campos, 122 N.M.
148, 921 P.2d 1266 (1996); State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 817 P.2d 1196 (1991); and (3) the lesser depraved mind
murder, see e.g., State v. McCrary, 100 N.M. 671,675 P.2d 120 (1984). See also Romero, supra note 11, at 67.
At the time of Professor Romero's article, the Supreme Court of New Mexico had not expressly accepted the
uniform jury instruction committee commentary position that second-degree murder requires an objective test. See
Romero, supra note 11, at 67. No New Mexico appellate case had held that the mens rea element of second-degree
murder was objective knowledge. See id. at 66. Rather, the New Mexico Supreme Court had indicated that second
degree murder requires actual knowledge. See id. at 67-68. In one such case, State v. Beach, 102 N.M. 642, 645,
699 P.2d 115, 118 (1985), the court stated that "[i]n referring to second-degree murder as a 'specific intent' crime,
this court was referring to the fact that second-degree murder . . . now contains an element of subjective
knowledge." See also Romero, supra note 11, at 67-68. The Beach case concerned first-degree willful, deliberate
and premeditated murder, not first-degree depraved mind murder. See Beach, 102 N.M. at 643, 699 P.2d at 116.
But see State v. Brown, 122 N.M. 724, 728, 931 P.2d 69, 73 (1996) (overruling Beach to the extent that it held
"that second-degree murder contains the same 'subjective knowledge' element as depraved mind murder"). Based
on this discussion, it is possible that the objective knowledge element ascribed by the Brown court to second-degree
murder may apply to second-degree murder, generally.
177. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1994); N.M. U.J.I CRIM. 14-210 to 14-211.
178. State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 563, 817 P.2d 1196, 1205 (1991). The effect of Brown is to completely
eviscerate the felony murder rule established in Ortega.See Brown, 122 N.M. at 728, 931 P.2d at 73 ("Seconddegree murder.. . contains a component involving an 'objective knowledge' of the risk, without the required
showing that the risk-creating act was performed with a wicked and malignant heart."). Thus in expressly
overruling the pertinent portion of Beach, the court left no doubt as to the general applicability of the objective
knowledge element to second-degree murder. See id. (overruling, in pertinent part, Beach, 102 N.M. at 645, 699
P.2d at 118).
179. See supra notes 77-86, 99-107, 142-44 and accompanying text.
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"subjective knowledge" requires consideration of relevant intoxication would
extend to second-degree murder.' However, under this more principled view,
Brown's subjective-objective knowledge distinction vanishes along with the
distinction between second-degree murder and first-degree depraved mind murder.
This result would return the court to its original problem faced in Brown, of
adequately distinguishing two degrees of unintentional murder based upon riskcreating conduct: first-degree depraved mind murder and second-degree murder. t81
The importance to New Mexico's criminal justice system in distinguishing
between second-degree murder and first-degree murder is undisputed.'82 The Brown
court sought to clarify the mens rea with its subjective-objective knowledge
distinction. However, on closer analysis, it is questionable that Brown's subjectiveobjective knowledge distinction provides a more principled homicide scheme.
Rather, it potentially creates more problems than it solves, 83 is contrary to the
language of the murder statute, 184 and may violate constitutional due process
guarantees. 85
C.

The ContinuedApplication of the Specific-GeneralIntent Rationale to New
Mexico's Murder Scheme is Unjustified
The Brown court undermined the justification for the continued use of the
specific-general intent analysis when it created the subjective knowledge exception
for first-degree depraved mind murder. The court noted criticisms that the specificgeneral intent rationale has garnered.' 86 These criticisms are well-deserved as
87
evidenced by the confusion found in New Mexico Supreme Court opinions.
Besides the confusion that the specific-general intent analysis provokes, the
Egelhoff concurring and dissenting opinions cast severe doubt as to the

180. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 61-80 (1996) (O'Connor, J., with whom Justices Souter, Breyer
and Stevens join, dissenting) (raising due process concerns about restrictions placed on a defendant's ability to raise
an effective defense to a state's accusations where the statute required "purposely" or "knowingly" as the mens rea
of the offense); see also id. at 57-61 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (avoiding due process concerns by
comprehending the challenged Montana statute as a legislative measure redefining mens rea); supra notes 99-108
and accompanying text.
181. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72.
182. See id.
183. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text. The Brown court fails to clarify when or under what
circumstance second-degree murder requires only a mens rea of objective knowledge. Justice Minzner's dissent
in Brown suggests that the majority's holding, that intoxication is relevant to proving depraved mind murder, is
difficult to reconcile with State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266 (1996), which held that intoxication is
not a defense to second-degree murder. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 735, 931 P.2d at 80 (Minzner, J., dissenting). In
her dissent, she further indicates that if Brown lacked the ability to form the requisite mens rea of subjective
knowledge, the jury "would have had to find that he lacked even the general criminal intent required for seconddegree murder or voluntary manslaughter," under the applicable jury instructions. d (referring to N.M. U.J.L CRIM.
14-141, 14-210, 14-220). Jury Instruction 14-141 defining general criminal intent provides: "A person acts
intentionally when he purposely does an act which the law declares to be a crime." N.M. U.J.I. CRiM. 14-141.
Justice Minzner's particular reference to voluntary manslaughter as opposed to involuntary manslaughter is
unexplained. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 735, 931 P.2d at 80 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
184. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (requiring knowledge for second-degree murder).
185. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,61-80 (1996) (concurring and dissenting opinions); supra notes
99-107, 142-44 and accompanying text.
186. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 729, 931 P.2d at 74.
187. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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constitutionality of New Mexico's specific-general intent approach.' Absent any
subsequent legislative redefining of offenses, where a legislature has specifically
defined the mens rea element of an offense to be "purposeful" or "knowing," due
process requires that intoxication evidence be considered as relevant to rebut the
existence of the requisite mens rea. s9
The Brown court, in its favorable discussion of the Egelhoff dissent, confirmed
that "New Mexico does not have a statute that excludes evidence of voluntary
intoxication.' 19 Despite the New Mexico legislature having expressly defined the
191
mens rea element of second-degree murder as "knowledge of the risk of his acts,
second-degree murder is defined as a general intent crime for which intoxication
evidence is irrelevant. 92 Under Campos, the "felony-murder rule only... raise[s]
second-degree murder to first-degree murder when murder is committed in the
course of a dangerous felony"'9 a and, as such, is a general intent crime, for which
intoxication evidence is irrelevant. 94
After Brown, it seems arbitrary for the courts to continue to apply the specificgeneral intent rationale to New Mexico's murder scheme. Both first-degree
depraved mind murder and first-degree felony murder were traditionally defined as
general intent crimes. 95 After Brown, intoxication evidence is relevant to firstdegree depraved mind murder but not to first-degree felony murder. Such a
dichotomy runs contrary to New Mexico courts' stated commitment to
distinguishing between degrees of homicide on the basis of culpable mental
states. 196 New Mexico's treatment of first-degree felony murder effectively attaches
an irrebuttable presumption of intensified culpability to a second-degree murder
committed during an inherently dangerous felony. Such a presumption may be seen
as inconsistent with New Mexico's concern that penal consequences be proportional
to moral culpability.
Moreover, such a presumption is at odds with the due process analysis presented
in Justice O'Connor's dissent in Egelhoff.97 The Brown court's apparent adoption
of this due process analysis makes constitutionally infirm any continued reliance
upon the specific-general intent analysis in determining the relevance of
intoxication in rebutting the existence of the knowledge element of murder' 98 First-

188. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 57-61 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (characterizing the Montana
statute as "redefining the mens tea" avoids the due process "constitutional shoal"). See also idJ at 61-73 (O'Connor,
J., with whom Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer join, dissenting) (stating that due process is violated when
relevant intoxication evidence is removed from a jury's consideration in its determination of the existence of the
mental state, where it is an essential element of the offence that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); supra
notes 99-107 and accompanying text (discussing in more detail the Egelhoff opinions).
189. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 61-62.
190. Brown, 122 N.M. at 731-32, 931 P.2d at 76-77.
191. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(B) (Repi. Pamp. 1994).
192. See State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148, 157, 921 P.2d 1266, 1276 (1996).
193. Id. at 154, 921 P.2d at 1272.
194. See id. at 159, 921 P.2d at 1277.
195. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 729-30, 931 P.2d at 74-75.
196. See id. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72.
197. See Egeihoff, 518 U.S. at 61-73 (O'Connor, J., with whom Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer join,
dissenting).
198. The Brown court defined the "subjective knowledge" of first-degree depraved mind murder as "an
essential element" of the offense. Brown, 122 N.M. at 726-27, 931 P.2d 71-72. This is despite the absence of an
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degree felony murder is based upon proving that the defendant intentionally killed
or "knew that the conduct was greatly dangerous to the lives of others" during the
commission of an inherently dangerous felony.'99 The Brown court's stated due
process concerns suggest that exclusion of exculpatory intoxication evidence in a
first-degree felony murder case violates the defendants right to present a defense
and impermissibly eases the state's burden to prove its case. However, while
expressing such due process concerns with regard to first-degree depraved mind
murder, the Brown court also reaffirmed the continued application of the specificgeneral intent analysis to exclude voluntary intoxication evidence for first-degree
felony murder.2"u Thus, after Brown, New Mexico criminal law is left with
significant uncertainty due to the tension that exists in New Mexico's homicide
scheme between first-degree depraved mind murder and first-degree felony murder.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Brown Creates an IrreconcilableAnomaly Between First-DegreeDepraved
Mind Murder and Felony Murder
The Brown court did not recognize or attempt to reconcile the disparity of
treatment of intoxication evidence between first-degree depraved mind murder and
felony murder." Prior to Brown, both are first-degree murders, subject to the most
severe of penal consequences;' both were defined as general intent crimes for
which intoxication evidence was irrelevant to rebut the mens rea element of the
crime; °3 and both can involve unintentional killings. With the Brown court's
application of the subjective-objective knowledge distinction to first-degree
depraved mind murder, starkly different "intensified culpability" standards
distinguish each of these first-degree offenses from second-degree murder. 2°4
The Campos decision held that intoxication is not a defense to first-degree felony
murder because, as a second-degree murder (committed during an inherently
dangerous felony) it is a general intent crime.2 "5 Under Brown's "intensified

A.

express "knowledge" term in the first-degree murder statute. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
Thus the "subjective knowledge" term in first-degree depraved mind murder is implied, whereas the second-degree
murder statute expressly requires knowledge of the risk. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
It would be somewhat disingenuous to construe the second-degree murder statute's knowledge element as "nonessential" to the offense, so as to avoid any due process constraints.
199. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (emphasis added).
200. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 730, 931 P.2d at 75.
201. See id. at 735, 931 P.2d at 80 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72.
203. See id. at 729-30, 931 P.2d at 74-75.
204. See id. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72.
205. See State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148, 161,921 P.2d 1266, 1279 (1996). In Campos, the defendant was
convicted of first-degree criminal sexual penetration (CSP) and first-degree felony murder. See id. at 150, 921 P.2d
1268. The acts causing the victim's death were committed after both the defendant and the victim had been
drinking for many hours. See id Over the course of the evening, the two had engaged in horseplay with sexual
overtones. See id. At one point the victim began acting like a dog. See id. Someone commented that he needed a
tail. See id. A short time later, the defendant twice thrust a mop handle into the victim's anus (two acts of CSP),
which resulted in the victim's death. See id. at 150-51, 921 P.2d 1268-69. In the trial judge's findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the judge noted that "he had a reasonable doubt as to whether Campos knew his acts created
a strong probability of death because of Campos's voluntary intoxication." Id. at 151, 921 P.2d at 1269.
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culpability" reasoning,' as a general intent crime, to justify felony murder's grave
penal consequences, increased culpability must be inferred from the risk-creating
conduct (commission of the concomitant dangerous felony). However, where the
killing is unintentional, as it may have been in Campos,2' it is questionable that the
risk-creating conduct, alone, sufficiently "intensifies" the objective knowledge
element of second-degree murder to warrant the serious penal consequences of firstdegree felony murder. Considering the legislature's description of the risk-creating
conduct for first-degree depraved mind murder, this disjunction of culpability is
particularly evident."' Nonetheless, under Campos, as affirmed by Brown, felony
murder is categorized as a general intent crime for which intoxication is irrelevant
to rebut this inferred elevated mens rea.2t 9
In contrast, first-degree depraved mind murder requires "subjective knowledge"
in addition to the "risk-creating conduct" in order to justify the serious -penal
consequences of first-degree murder.21 After Brown, with the requirement of
"subjective knowledge," first-degree depraved mind murder is no longer categorized
as a general intent crime.2 The culpable mental state of first-degree depraved mind
murder may be rebutted by a "lack of proof' defense based on intoxication
evidence. 1 2
An irreconcilable anomaly is created by the New Mexico Supreme Court's
failure, in Brown, to reconcile the Campos holding with Brown's position that riskcreating conduct alone fails to distinguish between the culpability of first-degree
murder from that of second-degree murder. The Brown court, in effect, added an
intermediate "intent" category of "subjective knowledge" to the specific-general
intent analysis to distinguish the culpability of first-degree depraved mind murder
from second-degree murder. This intermediate level requires an actual awareness
of the risk attendant to the actor's conduct, for which intoxication evidence may be
considered.21 3 Felony murder continues to be treated as a general intent crime.214
This effectively overrules Ortega,which held that second-degree murder requires
an actual awareness of the risk, to be elevated to first-degree felony murder. The

206. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 727, 921 P.2d at 72.
207. Not only is it difficult to apply the Brown court's analysis (with the second-degree mens tea of objective
knowledge) to Campos, it is contrary to an earlier holding. See State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 563, 817 P.2d 1196,
1205 (1991) (holding that to convict for felony murder requires "proof that the defendant intended to kill (or was
knowingly heedless that death might result from his conduct). An unintentional or accidental killing will not
suffice.").
208. Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (defining the risk-creating conduct of
first-degree depraved mind murder as "greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind
regardless of human life") with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1994) (defining the risk-creating
conduct as commission of any felony). Note that the courts have construed "any felony" to only include inherently
dangerous felonies. See State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 563, 817 P.2d 1196, 1205 (1991). Committing a dangerous

felony, without more, seems inadequate to elevate the mens sea sufficiently to justify the penal consequences of
first-degree murder. Under Brown's intensified mens rea rationale, it would seem equally appropriate to require
subjective knowledge of the actor to justify the severe penal consequences of felony murder.
209. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 730, 931 P.2d at 75.
210. See id. at 727-28, 931 P.2d at 72-73.

211.
212.
213.
214.

See id. at 731, 931 P.2dat 76.
See id. at 732, 931 P.2dat77.
See Brown, 122 N.M. at 727-28, 921 P.2d at 72-73.
See id at 730, 931 P.2d at 75 (affirmatively recognizing the relevant holding of State v. Campos, 122

N.M. 148, 160,921 P.2d 1266, 1278 (1996)).
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Brown court did not attempt to justify the anomalous treatment of these two firstdegree murders." 5
The IrreconcilableAnomaly Createdby Brown Invites Revision of New
Mexico's Homicide Scheme
The New Mexico Criminal Code provides New Mexico courts with major
obstacles in establishing a coherent homicide scheme." 6 The New Mexico Supreme
Court's interpretation of this scheme is unclear, in part because there are four
different classifications of unintentional homicides."1 7 Legislative elimination of
depraved mind murder from first-degree murder status would serve to ameliorate
some of the New Mexico courts' difficulties in developing clear and principled
distinctions between degrees of homicide while bringing New Mexico in line with
the majority of states.
Classifying depraved mind murder as a second-degree murder would allow the
New Mexico Supreme Court to reevaluate the murder statute and remove the
anomaly created by the Brown decision. New Mexico would no longer need to
apply the specific-general intent analysis to homicides to distinguish between the
different degrees of murder. As a result, New Mexico could reject this common law
approach to eliminate the due process concerns discussed in Justice O'Connor's
Egelhoff dissent.2"'
B.

The Model Penal Code Provides a Viable Alternative to New Mexico's
Specific-GeneralIntent Approach
The Model Penal Code (MPC) provides a viable alternative to the specificgeneral intent approach to distinguish between grades of homicides in its use of the
"recklessness" mens rea in determining the relevance of intoxication. 2 9 New
Mexico's second-degree murder, as defined and construed, could be described as
including rash intentional (purposeful or knowing) killing and reckless killing,
C.

215. See id. at 730,931 P.2d at 75. The Brown court stressed that "[f]irst-degree murder is reserved for the
most blameworthy... class of homicides" and that "the difference in culpable mental states is crucial in justifying
the more serious penal consequences of first-degree murder." Id. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72. It also stressed the
criticism given to the specific-general intent approach. See id. at 729, 931 P.2d at 74. However, the court simply
noted that it had "recently affirmed New Mexico's approach by applying the general-specific intent analysis to
exclude voluntary intoxication evidence for the crime of felony murder." Id. at 730, 931 P.2d at 75 (citing Campos,
122 N.M. at 157-58, 921 P.2d at 1275-76). As noted earlier, before deciding Brown and after the U.S. Supreme
Court announced Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected a motion for
rehearing Campos. Thus the resulting anomaly between New Mexico's treatment of intoxication evidence for firstdegree depraved mind murder and first-degree felony murder remains unexplained.
216. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 727, 931 P.2d at 72 (describing New Mexico's statutory scheme as unique in
that it classifies depraved mind murder as a first-degree murder as well as having two degrees of unintentional
murder based on risk-taking behavior).
217. See Romero, supranote 11, at 55.
218. See Egeihoff, 518 U.S. at 61-73; see also supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
219. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.08(2), 210.2(1)(b) (1985) (identifying recklessness as a mens rea in
criminal homicides and one for which intoxication is not relevant); cf Campos, 122 N.M. at 161,921 P.2d at 1279
(referencing MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.08(2), 210.2(1)(b) (1985)); Brown, 122 N.M. at 735, 931 P.2d at 80
(Minzner, J., dissenting) (referring to the possible higher degree recklessness necessary to distinguish depraved
mind murder from second-degree murder).
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under the MPC culpability scheme.2 2 ° Voluntary intoxication does not negate the
mens rea of recklessness, but would be relevant to rebut a mens rea of either
purposeful or knowing, under the MPC. 22 By ascribing "recklessness" to the
awareness of the risk attendant to second-degree murder, potential due process
challenges could also be avoided.
Classifying depraved mind murder, a grossly reckless but unintentional killing,
as a second-degree murder eliminates some of the difficulties the New Mexico
Supreme Court has encountered in providing clear and principled distinctions
between degrees of murder.222 Under the MPC, to justify categorizing depraved
mind murder as a first-degree murder (along with willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder), it would require, at a minimum, a mens rea of "knowingly," for
which evidence of voluntary intoxication would be relevant to negate that essential
element of the offense. However, such a designation presents an oxymoron of sorts.
For example, an actor acts, knowing that such conduct is certain to result in a
killing, yet the killing is unintentional. In other words, "I knew it would kill him but
I didn't intend for him to die."
Under the MPC, the more appropriate mens rea for depraved mind murder is
extreme recklessness, which describes a conscious disregard of an unjustified risk.
Thus, under the MPC, it would be inappropriate to categorize depraved mind
murder in the most culpable homicide category. Therefore, within New Mexico's
murder scheme (which includes two degrees of murder), depraved mind murder
cannot properly be designated as a first-degree murder.223
If the legislature amends the murder statute by designating depraved mind murder
as a second-degree murder, the subjective-objective knowledge scheme for
depraved mind murder would become unnecessary. Voluntary intoxication would
be irrelevant to the actor's "reckless" mental state during conduct that resulted in
death. In turn, involuntary manslaughter could properly be distinguished from
second-degree murder, as having a mens rea of objective knowledge.

220. The MPC provides:
A person acts purposely... if... it is his conscious object to engage in conduct.., or to cause
such a result .... A person acts knowingly... if... he is aware that it is practically certain that
his conduct will cause such a result ....
A person acts recklessly ... when he consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk ....
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1985). Professor Romero described the different degrees of unintentional murder
as follows: (1) first-degree felony murder as an unlawful act unintentional criminal homicide; (2) first-degree
depraved mind murder as an unintentional criminal homicide without commission of an unlawful act; and (3)
second-degree unintentional murder as a criminal homicide without commission of an unlawful act). See Romero,
supra note 11, at 57-59. He further stated that for criminal homicides without the commission of an unlawful act,
"the New Mexico homicide provisions measure culpability by reference to a standard of recklessness or
negligence." Id. at 58 (footnotes omitted).
221. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985).
222. See Romero, supra note 11, at 58.
223. See State v. Brown, 122 N.M. 724, 735, 931 P.2d 69, 80 (1996) (Minzner, J., dissenting) ("I believe
it is possible that depraved-mind murder either requires a higher degree of recklessness than second-degree murder,
in which case intoxication in theory should not be a defense if we follow Campos, or that it requires knowledge
of a particular sort not required for second-degree murder, in which case intoxication might be a defense on specific
facts."). Givefi the MPC's definition of "knowing," it is unclear to which type of knowledge Justice Minzner is
referring. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
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Following this culpability scheme, a problem still remains for which a remedy
has already been alluded.224 Felony murder would still have a mens rea of
recklessness, being defined as a second-degree murder that occurred during the
commission of an inherently dangerous felony. With a mens rea of recklessness,
intoxication would be irrelevant. However, with a more faithful adherence to the
Ortega rule, to qualify as a first-degree felony murder, a killing would be required
to be committed during an inherently dangerous felony with an intent to kill or with
the knowledge that such conduct virtually guaranteed a killing would occur. A
reckless, unintentional killing, committed during a dangerous felony would qualify
only as a second-degree murder. With first-degree felony murder requiring a mens
rea of "purposely" or "knowingly," voluntary intoxication would be relevant to
negativing that mens rea. For the unintentional killing classified as a second-degree
murder, with the lesser mens rea of recklessness, intoxication evidence would be
irrelevant.
Thus, with one legislative modification, the unworkable subjective-objective
knowledge distinction as applied to depraved mind murder could be abandoned and
only murders committed with an intent to kill (a mens rea of "purposely" or
"knowingly," under the MPC) would qualify as first-degree murders. Under this
scheme only willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and "intentional" felony
murder would qualify as first-degree murder. Under this scheme justice is served
because New Mexico courts would no longer have to strain to devise fictions to
justify, under the culpability framework, the punishment assigned to an offense.
D. The Uniform CriminalJury InstructionsNeed to be Revised
The homicide jury instructions can confuse or mislead, rather than provide clarity
and guidance.22 This is particularly evident in the depraved mind murder
instruction and committee commentary establishing the subjective-objective
knowledge distinction. The Brown dissent recognizes that the majority's holding
blurs what distinctions there were between the second-degree murder and
manslaughter instructions. 7 Justice Minzner's professed difficulty in understanding what the majority means by "subjective knowledge" underscores the problems
that practitioners and jurors face in identifying substantive differences between the
various homicide instructions.22 Admittedly, the drafting committee's task is
challenging in light of the lack of guidance provided in the present statutory
homicide scheme. The revised involuntary manslaughter jury instruction is a first

224. See State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554,557, 817 P.2d 1196, 1199 (1991) (establishing the mens rea for firstdegree murder as an intent to kill).
225. See supra notes 26-75 and accompanying text.
226. See N.M. U.J.. CRIM. 14-203; see also supra notes 51-61.
227. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 735, 931 P.2d at 80 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
228. See id. at 734, 931 P.2d at 79 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
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step. 229 Nevertheless, even modest revisions would be an improvement, with
clarifying explanations included with the instructions.230
New Mexico's Homicide Scheme May Prove Inconsistent with Constitutional Due ProcessLimitations
The dissenting and concurring opinions in Egelhoff 3 suggest that the exclusion
of exculpatory intoxication evidence relevant to rebut the statutory mens rea
element of "purposely" or "knowingly" offends the Constitution, absent "legislative
redefinition of mens rea. ' 23 2 Such exclusion of exculpatory evidence violates the
due process right to present a defense while easing the State's burden to prove its
case. 233 Both the Brown and Campos decisions exclude exculpatory intoxication
evidence relevant to rebut the express statutory mens rea element of "knowledge"
in second-degree murder.234 If the "knowledge" mens rea element equates to the
MPC's mens rea of "knowingly" as it apparently was used in Egelhoff, these
holdings would conflict with the due process concerns of five United States
Supreme Court Justices. 5 Such potential conflict exposes New Mexico's homicide
statutes to federal constitutional challenges. Thus, the New Mexico Supreme
Court's exclusion of exculpatory evidence provides significant uncertainty in New
Mexico criminal law. When New Mexico removes such conflict, progress will have
been made toward the goal of a clear and principled justice system in New Mexico.
E.

229. See N.M. U.J.. CRIM. 14-231 (as amended by N.M. Order 97-23). The amendment to this jury
instruction, effective August 1, 1997, eliminated the unlawful act-negligent act causation dichotomy of the former
instruction. The committee commentary indicates that both the lawful and "unlawful" acts "require a showing of
an underlying unlawful act." Id. (committee commentary). This simplifies involuntary manslaughter prosecutions.
The pre-amendment instruction required that "[tihe defendant knew or should have known" of the risk of his
conduct. N.M. U.J.I. CRIM. 14-231 (amended 1997). As amended, the instruction requires that the defendant
"should have known of the danger of [his] actions." Id. (as amended by N.M. Order 97-23). This would seem to
remove some confusion. However, this is immediately followed by a requirement that the defendant "acted with
a willful disregardfor the safety of others." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, a lack of clarity persists.
230. See Romero, supra note 11, at 83-86. In advocating jury instruction revision, Professor Romero poses
alternative uniform jury instructions, primarily based on the MPC and contingent upon the legislature providing
for only second-degree depraved mind murder. See id. In his proposed jury instructions, he clearly distinguishes
Professor Romero advocates
which offenses use an objective standard and which use a subjective standard. See id.
that the differences in culpability for unintentional killings be based "on the degree of the risk created" and, where
an objective standard is used, on the "degree of deviation from the standard of care exercised by the reasonable
person." See id.' at 79. Where a subjective standard is used, he argues that the mens rea of recklessness should
require a "subjective awareness of the risk of death and the conscious disregard of that risk" and that the risk be
"substantial and unjustifiable." See id. at 80. The mens rea for murder should require a minimum culpability of
recklessness, see id. at 81, with the degree of culpability determined by the degree of risk and the attendant mens
rea. See id. at 85. Professor Romero identifies a great need for inclusion of explanations in jury instructions that
at 83-84.
clarify the distinctions between different offenses. See id.
231. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,57-61 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 61-73 (O'Connor,
J., with whom Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer join, dissenting); see also supra notes 99-107 and
accompanying text.
with whom Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer join,
232. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 61-73 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
233. See id. at 61 (O'Connor, J., with whom Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer join, dissenting).
234. See Brown, 122 N.M. at 732, 931 P.2d at 77; State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148, 160, 921 P.2d 1266,
1278.
235. See Egelhoff,518 U.S. at 57-58 (Ginsburg, J., concuning); id. at 61 (O'Connor, J., with whom Justices
Stevens, Souter and Breyer join, dissenting).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Brown, the New Mexico Supreme Court abandoned the distinction between
depraved mind murder and second-degree murder, based on the number of persons
subjected to the risk of death. Instead, it opted to create a narrow "specific
knowledge" exception to the specific-general intent approach traditionally used to
determine the relevance of intoxication evidence in proving an offense. The court
held that intoxication is a defense to first-degree depraved mind murder. This
offense had traditionally been viewed as a general intent crime for which
intoxication was irrelevant. However, in so holding, the court made it clear that it
was not completely abandoning the specific-general intent approach. This common
law analysis continues to exclude voluntary intoxication evidence for second-degree
murder and, therefore, felony murder. While the court apparently sought to provide
more principled distinctions between the culpability attached to the different classes
of homicides, the court's reasoning fails to justify New Mexico's felony murder
doctrine and seriously calls into doubt the continued application of the specificgeneral intent approach in New Mexico's homicide scheme. The New Mexico
Supreme Court has created an irreconcilable anomaly in New Mexico criminal
jurisprudence and may expose the New Mexico homicide statutory scheme,
particularly second-degree murder and felony murder, to federal constitutional due
process challenges, under the Egelhoff dissent's analysis.236
VICKI W. ZELLE

236. See id. at 61-73 (O'Connor, J., with whom Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer join, dissenting).

